Showing posts with label Bill of Rights. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bill of Rights. Show all posts

Saturday, December 15, 2007

Bill of Rights Day


Jonathan Adler at the Volokh Conspiracy reminds me that December 15 is Bill of Rights Day. To commemorate it, I thought I'd present James Madison's speech to the House of Representatives on June 8, 1789, in which he proposed amendments to the Constitution. Ten of his proposals were ultimately adopted as the first ten amendments on December 15, 1791. An eleventh proposal was ultimately ratified two hundred one years later as the Twenty Seventh Amendment.

Madison is generally referred to as the father of the Constitution. But it's probably more accurate to say that he was the father of the Bill of Rights. Had he not pushed for amendments in the first Congress, it is entirely possible, and perhaps likely, that the amendments that became the Bill of Rights would not have been proposed to and ratified by the states.

Here, then, is Mr. Madison. I have added jumps to the relevant sections of the Constitution that Madison was proposing to amend, and to the amendments as they were ultimately ratified. It is certainly worth comparing the texts of the amendments that Madison proposed with the texts that ultimately became part of the document.

I am sorry to be accessary to the loss of a single moment of time by the house. If I had been indulged in my motion, and we had gone into a committee of the whole, I think we might have rose, and resumed the consideration of other business before this time; that is, so far as it depended on what I proposed to bring forward. As that mode seems not to give satisfaction, I will withdraw the motion, and move you, sir, that a select committee be appointed to consider and report such amendments as are proper for Congress to propose to the legislatures of the several States, conformably to the 5th article of the constitution.

I will state my reasons why I think it proper to propose amendments; and state the amendments themselves, so far as I think they ought to be proposed. If I thought I could fulfill the duty which I owe to myself and my constituents, to let the subject pass over in silence, I most certainly should not trespass upon the indulgence of this house. But I cannot do this; and am therefore compelled to beg a patient hearing to what I have to lay before you. And I do most sincerely believe that if congress will devote but one day to this subjects, so far as to satisfy the public that we do not disregard their wishes, it will have a salutary influence on the public councils, and prepare the way for a favorable reception of our future measures.

It appears to me that this house is bound by every motive of prudence, not to let the first session pass over without proposing to the state legislatures some things to be incorporated into the constitution, as will render it as acceptable to the whole people of the United States, as it has been found acceptable to a majority of them. I wish, among other reasons why something should be done, that those who have been friendly to the adoption of this constitution, may have the opportunity of proving to those who were opposed to it, that they were as sincerely devoted to liberty and a republican government, as those who charged them with wishing the adoption of this constitution in order to lay the foundation of an aristocracy or despotism. It will be a desirable thing to extinguish from the bosom of every member of the community any apprehensions, that there are those among his countrymen who wish to deprive them of the liberty for which they valiantly fought and honorably bled. And if there are amendments desired, of such a nature as will not injure the constitution, and they can be engrafted so as to give satisfaction to the doubting part of our fellow citizens; the friends of the federal government will evince that spirit of deference and concession for which they have hitherto been distinguished.

It cannot be a secret to the gentlemen in this house, that, notwithstanding the ratification of this system of government by eleven of the thirteen United States, in some cases unanimously, in others by large majorities; yet still there is a great number of our constituents who are dissatisfied with it; among whom are many respectable for their talents, their patriotism, and respectable for the jealousy they have for their liberty, which, though mistaken in its object, is laudable in its motive. There is a great body of the people falling under this description, who as present feel much inclined to join their support to the cause of federalism, if they were satisfied in this one point: We ought not to disregard their inclination, but, on principles of amity and moderation, conform to their wishes, and expressly declare the great rights of mankind secured under this constitution. The acquiescence which our fellow citizens show under the government, calls upon us for a like return of moderation. But perhaps there is a stronger motive than this for our going into a consideration of the subject; it is to provide those securities for liberty which are required by a part of the community. I allude in a particular manner to those two states who have not thought fit to throw themselves into the bosom of the confederacy: it is a desirable thing, on our part as well as theirs, that a re-union should take place as soon as possible. I have no doubt, if we proceed to take those steps which would be prudent and requisite at this juncture, that in a short time we should see that disposition prevailing in those states that are not come in, that we have seen prevailing [in] those states which are.

But I will candidly acknowledge, that, over and above all these considerations, I do conceive that the constitution may be amended; that is to say, if all power is subject to abuse, that then it is possible the abuse of the powers of the general government may be guarded against in a more secure manner than is now done, while no one advantage, arising from the exercise of that power, shall be damaged or endangered by it. We have in this way something to gain, and, if we proceed with caution, nothing to lose; and in this case it is necessary to proceed with caution; for while we feel all these inducements to go into a revisal of the constitution, we must feel for the constitution itself, and make that revisal a moderate one. I should be unwilling to see a door opened for a re-consideration of the whole structure of the government, for a re-consideration of the principles and the substance of the powers given; because I doubt, if such a door was opened, if we should be very likely to stop at that point which would be safe to the government itself: But I do wish to see a door opened to consider, so far as to incorporate those provisions for the security of rights, against which I believe no serious objection has been made by any class of our constituents, such as would be likely to meet with the concurrence of two-thirds of both houses, and the approbation of three-fourths of the state legislatures. I will not propose a single alteration which I do not wish to see take place, as intrinsically proper in itself, or proper because it is wished for by a respectable number of my fellow citizens; and therefore I shall not propose a single alteration but is likely to meet the concurrence required by the constitution.

There have been objections of various kinds made against the constitution: Some were levelled against its structure, because the president was without a council; because the senate, which is a legislative body, had judicial powers in trials on impeachments; and because the powers of that body were compounded in other respects, in a manner that did not correspond with a particular theory; because it grants more power than is supposed to be necessary for every good purpose; and controls the ordinary powers of the state governments. I know some respectable characters who opposed this government on these grounds; but I believe that the great mass of the people who opposed it, disliked it because it did not contain effectual provision against encroachments on particular rights, and those safeguards which they have been long accustomed to have interposed between them and the magistrate who exercised the sovereign power: nor ought we to consider them safe, while a great number of our fellow citizens think these securities necessary.

It has been a fortunate thing that the objection to the government has been made on the ground I stated; because it will be practicable on that ground to obviate the objection, so far as to satisfy the public mind that their liberties will be perpetual, and this without endangering any part of the constitution, which is considered as essential to the existence of the government by those who promoted its adoption.

The amendments which have occurred to me, proper to be recommended by congress to the state legislatures are these:

First. That there be prefixed to the constitution a declaration —

That all power is originally vested in, and consequently derived from the people.

That government is instituted, and ought to be exercised for the benefit of the people; which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of acquiring and using property, and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.

That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform or change their government, whenever it be found adverse or inadequate to the purposes of its institution.

Secondly. That in article 2nd. section 2, clause 3, these words be struck out, to wit, "The number of representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each state shall have at least one representative, and until such enumeration shall be made." And that in place thereof be inserted these words, to wit, "After the first actual enumeration, there shall be one representative for every thirty thousand, until the number amount to after which the proportion shall be so regulated by congress, that the number shall never be less than nor more than but each state shall after the first enumeration, have at least two representatives; and prior thereto."

Thirdly. That in article 2nd, section 6, clause 1, there be added to the end of the first sentence, these words, to wit, "But no law varying the compensation last ascertained shall operate before the next ensuing election of representatives."

Fourthly. That in article 2nd, section 9, between clauses 3 and 4, be inserted these clauses, to wit,

The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience by in any manner, or on any pretext infringed.

The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.

The people shall not be restrained from peaceably assembling and consulting for their common good, nor from applying to the legislature by petitions, or remonstrances for redress of their grievances.

The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed, and well regulated militia being the best security of a free country: but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in person.

No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner; nor at any time, but in a manner warranted by law.

No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment, or one trial for the same office; nor shall be compelled to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor be obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be necessary for public use, without a just compensation.

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and their other property from all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusation, to be confronted with his accusers, and the witnesses against him; to have a compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the people; or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.

Fifthly. That in article 2nd, section 10, between clauses 1 and 2, be inserted this clause, to wit: No state shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases.

Sixthly. That in article 3rd, section 2, be annexed to the end of clause 2nd, these words to wit: but no appeal to such court shall be allowed where the value in controversy shall not amount to___dollars: nor shall any fact triable by jury, according to the course of common law, be otherwise re-examinable than may consist with the principles of common law.

Seventhly. That in article 3rd, section 2, the third clause be struck out (see Constitution 3.2.3), and in its place be inserted the classes following, to wit:

The trial of all crimes (except in cases of impeachments, and cases arising in the land or naval forces, or the militia when on actual service in time of war or public danger) shall be by an impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage, with the requisite of unanimity for conviction, of the right of challenge, and other accustomed requisites; and in all crimes punishable with loss of life or member, presentment or indictment by a grand jury shall be an essential preliminary, provided that in cases of crimes committed within any county which may be in possession of an enemy, or in which a general insurrection may prevail, the trial may by law be authorized in some other county of the same state, as near as may be to the seat of the offence.

In cases of crimes committed not within any county, the trial may by law be in such county as the laws shall have prescribed. In suits at common law, between man and man, the trial by jury, as one of the best securities to the rights of the people, ought to remain inviolate.

Eighthly. That immediately after article 6th, be inserted, as article 7th, the clauses following, to wit:

The powers delegated by this constitution, are appropriated to the departments to which they are respectively distributed: so that the legislative department shall never exercise the powers vested in the executive or judicial; nor the executive exercise the powers vested in the legislative or judicial; nor the judicial exercise the powers vested in the legislative or executive departments.

The powers not delegated by this constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the States respectively.

Ninthly. That article 7th, be numbered as article 8th.

The first of these amendments, relates to what may be called a bill of rights; I will own that I never considered this provision so essential to the federal constitution, as to make it improper to ratify it, until such an amendment was added; at the same time, I always conceived, that in a certain form and to a certain extent, such a provision was neither improper nor altogether useless. I am aware, that a great number of the most respectable friends to the government and champions for republican liberty, have thought such a provision, not only unnecessary, but even improper, nay, I believe some have gone so far as to think it even dangerous. Some policy has been made use of perhaps by gentlemen on both sides of the question: I acknowledge the ingenuity of those arguments which were drawn against the constitution, by a comparison with the policy of Great-Britain, in establishing a declaration of rights; but there is too great a difference in the case to warrant the comparison: therefore the arguments drawn from that source, were in a great measure inapplicable. In the declaration of rights which that country has established, the truth is, they have gone no farther, than to raise a barrier against the power of the crown; the power of the legislature is left altogether indefinite. Although I know whenever the great rights, the trial by jury, freedom of the press, or liberty of conscience, came in question in that body, the invasion of them is resisted by able advocates, yet their Magna Charta does not contain any one provision for the security of those rights, respecting which, the people of America are most alarmed. The freedom of the press and rights of conscience, those choicest privileges of the people, are unguarded in the British constitution.

But although the case may be widely different, and it may not be thought necessary to provide limits for the legislative power in that country, yet a different opinion prevails in the United States. The people of many states, have thought it necessary to raise barriers against power in all forms and departments of government, and I am inclined to believe, if once bills of rights are established in all the states as well as the federal constitution, we shall find the although some of them are rather unimportant, yet, upon the whole, they will have a salutary tendency.

It may be said, in some instances they do no more than state the perfect equality of mankind; this to be sure is an absolute truth, yet it is not absolutely necessary to be inserted at the head of a constitution.

In some instances they assert those rights which are exercised by the people in forming and establishing a plan of government. In other instances, they specify those rights which are retained when particular powers are given up to be exercised by the legislature. In other instances, they specify positive rights, which may seem to result from the nature of the compact. Trial by jury cannot be considered as a natural right, but a right resulting from the social compact which regulates the action of the community, but is as essential to secure the liberty of the people as any one of the pre-existent rights of nature. In other instances they lay down dogmatic maxims with respect to the construction of the government; declaring, that the legislative, executive, and judicial branches shall be kept separate and distinct: Perhaps the best way of securing this in practice is to provide such checks, as will prevent the encroachment of the one upon the other.

But whatever may be form which the several states have adopted in making declarations in favor of particular rights, the great object in view is to limit and qualify the powers of government, by excepting out of the grant of power those cases in which the government ought not to act, or to act only in a particular mode. They point these exceptions sometimes against the abuse of the executive power, sometimes against the legislative, and, in some cases, against the community itself; or, in other words, against the majority in favor of the minority.

In our government it is, perhaps, less necessary to guard against the abuse in the executive department than any other; because it is not the stronger branch of the system, but the weaker: It therefore must be levelled against the legislative, for it is the most powerful, and most likely to be abused, because it is under the least control; hence, so far as a declaration of rights can tend to prevent the exercise of undue power, it cannot be doubted but such declaration is proper. But I confess that I do conceive, that in a government modified like this of the United States, the great danger lies rather in the abuse of the community than in the legislative body. The prescriptions in favor of liberty, ought to be levelled against that quarter where the greatest danger lies, namely, that which possesses the highest prerogative of power: But this [is] not found in either the executive or legislative departments of government, but in the body of the people, operating by the majority against the minority.

It may be thought all paper barriers against the power of the community are too weak to be worthy of attention. I am sensible they are not so strong as to satisfy gentlemen of every description who have seen and examined thoroughly the texture of such a defence; yet, as they have a tendency to impress some degree of respect for them, to establish the public opinion in their favor, and rouse the attention of the whole community, it may be one mean to control the majority from those acts to which they might be otherwise inclined.

It has been said by way of objection to a bill of rights, by many respectable gentlemen out of doors, and I find opposition on the same principles likely to be made by gentlemen on this floor, that they are unnecessary articles of a republican government, upon the presumption that the people have those rights in their own hands, and that is the proper place for them to rest. It would be a sufficient answer to say that this objection lies against such provisions under the state governments as well as under the general government; and there are, I believe, but few gentlemen who are inclined to push their theory so far as to say that a declaration of rights in those cases is either ineffectual or improper.

It has been said that in the federal government they are unnecessary, because the powers are enumerated, and it follows that all that are not granted by the constitution are retained: that the constitution is a bill of powers, the great residuum being the rights of the people; and therefore a bill of rights cannot be so necessary as if the residuum was thrown into the hands of the government. I admit that these arguments are not entirely without foundation; but they are not conclusive to the extent which has been supposed. It is true the powers of the general government are circumscribed; they are directed to particular objects; but even if government keeps within those limits, it has certain discretionary powers with respect to the means, which may admit of abuse to a certain extent, in the same manner as the powers of the state governments under their constitutions may to an indefinite extent; because in the constitution of the United States there is a clause granting to Congress the power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution all the powers vested in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof; this enables them to fulfil every purpose for which the government was established. Now, may not laws be considered necessary and proper by Congress, for it is them who are to judge of the necessity and propriety to accomplish those special purposes which they may have in contemplation, which laws in themselves are neither necessary or proper; as well as improper laws could be enacted by the state legislatures, for fulfilling the more extended objects of those governments. I will state an instance which I think in point, and proves that this might be the case. The general government has a right to pass all laws which shall be necessary to collect its revenue; the means for enforcing the collection are within the direction of the legislature: may not general warrants be considered necessary for this purpose, as well as for some purposes which it was supposed at the framing of their constitutions the state governments had in view. If there was reason for restraining the state governments from exercising this power, there is like reason for restraining the federal government.

It may be said, because it has been said, that a bill of rights is not necessary, because the establishment of this government has not repealed those declarations of rights which are added to the several state constitutions: that those rights of the people, which had been established by the most solemn act, could not be annihilated by a subsequent act of the people, who meant, and declared at the head of the instrument, that they ordained and established a new system, for the express purpose of securing to themselves and posterity the liberties they had gained by an arduous conflict.

I admit the force of this observation, but I do not look upon it to be conclusive. In the first place, it is too uncertain ground to leave this provision upon, if a provision is at all necessary to secure rights so important as many of those I have mentioned are conceived to be, by the public in general, as well as those in particular who opposed the adoption of this constitution. Beside some states have no bills of rights, there are others provided with very defective ones, and there are others whose bills of rights are not only defective, but absolutely improper; instead of securing some in the full extent which republican principles would require, they limit them too much to agree with the common ideas of liberty.

It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration, and it might follow by implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the general government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that may be guarded against. I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause of the 4th resolution.

It has been said, that it is necessary to load the constitution with this provision, because it was not found effectual in the constitution of the particular states. It is true, there are a few particular states in which some of the most valuable articles have not, at one time or other, been violated; but does it not follow but they may have, to a certain degree, a salutary effect against the abuse of power. If they are incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights. Beside this security, there is a great probability that such a declaration in the federal system would be enforced; because the state legislatures will jealously and closely watch the operation of this government, and be able to resist with more effect every assumption of power than any other power on earth can do; and the greatest opponents to a federal government admit the state legislatures to be sure guardians of the people's liberty. I conclude from this view of the subject, that it will be proper in itself, and highly politic, for the tranquility of the public mind, and the stability of the government, that we should offer something, in the form I have proposed, to be incorporated in the system of government, as a declaration of the rights of the people.

In the next place I wish to see that part of the constitution revised which declares, that the number of representatives shall not exceed the proportion of one for every thirty thousand persons, and allows one representative to every state which rates below that proportion. If we attend to the discussion of this subject, which has taken place in the state conventions, and even in the opinion of the friends to the constitution, an alteration here is proper. It is the sense of the people of America, that the number of representatives ought to be increased, but particularly that it should not be left in the discretion of the government to diminish them, below that proportion which certainly is in the power of the legislature as the constitution now stands; and they may, as the population of the country increases, increase the house of representatives to a very unwieldy degree. I confess I always thought this part of the constitution defective, though not dangerous; and that it ought to be particularly attended to whenever congress should go into the consideration of amendments.

There are several lesser cases enumerated in my proposition, in which I wish also to see some alteration take place. That article which leaves it in the power of the legislature to ascertain its own emolument is one to which I allude. I do not believe this is a power which, in the ordinary course of government, is likely to be abused, perhaps of all the powers granted, it is least likely to abuse; but there is a seeming impropriety in leaving any set of men without control to put their hand into the public coffers, to take out money to put in their pockets; there is a seeming indecorum in such power, which leads me to propose a change. We have a guide to this alteration in several of the amendments which the different conventions have proposed. I have gone therefore so far as to fix it, that no law, varying the compensation, shall operate until there is a change in the legislature; in which case it cannot be for the particular benefit of those who are concerned in determining the value of the service.

I wish also, in revising the constitution, we may throw into that section, which interdicts the abuse of certain powers in the state legislatures, some other provisions of equal if not greater importance than those already made. The words, "No state shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, &c." were wise and proper restrictions in the constitution. I think there is more danger of those powers being abused by the state governments than by the government of the United States. The same may be said of other powers which they possess, if not controlled by the general principle, that laws are unconstitutional which infringe the rights of the community. I should therefore wish to extend this interdiction, and add, as I have stated in the 5th resolution, that no state shall violate the equal right of conscience, freedom of the press, or trial by jury in criminal cases; because it is proper that every government should be disarmed of powers which trench upon those particular rights. I know in some of the state constitutions the power of the government is controlled by such a declaration, but others are not. I cannot see any reason against obtaining even a double security on those points; and nothing can give a more sincere proof of the attachment of those who opposed this constitution to these great and important rights, than to see them join in obtaining the security I have now proposed; because it must be admitted, on all hands, that the state governments are as liable to attack these invaluable privileges as the general government is, and therefore ought to be as cautiously guarded against.

I think it will be proper, with respect to the judiciary powers, to satisfy the public mind on those points which I have mentioned. Great inconvenience has been apprehended to suitors from the distance they would be dragged to obtain justice in the supreme court of the United States, upon an appeal on an action for a small debt. To remedy this, declare, that no appeal shall be made unless the matter in controversy amounts to a particular sum: This, with the regulations respecting jury trials in criminal cases, and suits at common law, it is to be hoped will quiet and reconcile the minds of the people to that part of the constitution.

I find, from looking into the amendments proposed by the state conventions, that several are particularly anxious that it should be declared in the constitution, that the powers not therein delegated, should be reserved to the several states. Perhaps words which may define this more precisely, than the whole of the instrument now does, may be considered as superfluous. I admit they may be deemed unnecessary; but there can be no harm in making such a declaration, if gentlemen will allow that the fact is as stated. I am sure I understand it so, and do therefore propose it.

These are the points on which I wish to see a revision of the constitution take place. How far they will accord with the sense of this body, I cannot take upon me absolutely to determine; but I believe every gentlemen will readily admit that nothing is in contemplation, so far as I have mentioned, that can endanger the beauty of the government in any one important feature, even in the eyes of its most sanguine admirers. I have proposed nothing that does not appear to me as proper in itself, or eligible as patronized by a respectable number of our fellow citizens; and if we can make the constitution better in the opinion of those who are opposed to it, without weakening its frame, or abridging its usefulness, in the judgment of those who are attached to it, we act the part of wise and liberal men to make such alterations as shall produce that effect.

Having done what I conceived was my duty, in bringing before this house the subject of amendments, and also stated such as wish for and approve, and offered the reasons which occurred to me in their support; I shall content myself for the present with moving, that a committee be appointed to consider of and report such amendments as ought to be proposed by congress to the legislatures of the states, to become, if ratified by three-fourths thereof, part of the constitution of the United States. By agreeing to this motion, the subject may be going on in the committee, while other important business is proceeding to a conclusion in the house. I should advocate greater dispatch in the business of amendments, if I was not convinced of the absolute necessity there is of pursuing the organization of the government; because I think we should obtain the confidence of our fellow citizens, in proportion as we fortify the rights of the people against the encroachments of the government.

Wednesday, January 17, 2007

Justice Lumpkin's Bill of Rights V

As he builds to a crescendo, Justice Lumpkin's magnificent oratory swells with grandeur and unintentional irony. Print out this passage and read it aloud:

"[T]he Legislature . . . cannot commit political suicide, or rather parricide, by violating or destroying the great first principles of American civil liberty, as set forth and declared in the ten amendments of the Constitution -- a legal decalogue for every civilized society, in all time to come.

"No such attempt would be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority. To maintain that our Federal or State Legislature possess such a power, is, in our opinion, a political heresy, altogether inadmissible. The British Parliament dare not, at this day, with all its transcendental power, commit such an outrage. For such monstrosity in legislation we must go to semi-imperial France, or semi-barbarous Russia. Any attempt in this country, at this day, to establish religion; to curtail the freedom of speech or of the press; to deprive a party of the privilege of appearing personally, or by counsel; to inflict cruel or unusual punishments; to immure a prisoner without trial, in a dungeon for life; to subject a citizen to a star-chamber proceeding instead of a public trial; would shock not only the common sense, but sense of justice of the teeming millions in this free and happy country! Shame! shame! upon such legislation, would be indignantly uttered by ten thousand tongues!"

The picture above is of Thomas R.R. Cobb, Justice Lumpkin's son-in-law.

Justice Lumpkin's Bill of Rights IV

We have seen Justice Lumpkin espousing a truly remarkable and radical doctrine: even if State laws do not run afoul of the State constitution, judges can and should strike down State laws that violate the fundamental principle that republican government must protect life, liberty and property.

But does this not lead to judicial activism (as we would say today) run amok? Perhaps the most interesting part of this fascinating opinion is how Justice Lumpkin wrestles with, and resolves, this issue. He finds in the Bill of Rights a limiting principle that constrains judicial discretion. Judges should not strike down all legislative acts that they perceive may be violations of life, liberty and property. They should limit themselves to striking down only those enactments that violate the most important principles -- those declared by the people in the Bill of Rights.

The rhetoric and language are so wonderful that, as before, I will let Justice Lumpkin speak for himself. First, he identifies the problem of excessive judicial discretion:

"But we do not intend to put our opinion in this case upon this foundation [i.e., that courts may nullify all laws that violate life, liberty or property], however solid it may be. For while we have denied the omnipotence of the Legislature, the tendency of our administration, nevertheless has been, to side with those who refused to declare and Act of the Legislature void, because it conflicts with the Court's views of reason, expediency or justice; and who recommend an appeal to the ballot-box as the only remedy for unwise legislation. And one of the strongest arguments against Judicial interposition in such cases is, that apart from a written Constitution, our ideas of natural justice are vague and uncertain, regulated by no fixed standard; the ablest and best men differing widely upon this, as well as all other subjects."

Justice Lumpkin then proposes the solution: courts should limit their discretion by nullifying only those laws that violate the principles embodied in the Bill of Rights, declared by the People to constitute the bedrock principles of republican government:

"But as to questions arising under these amendments [the Bill of Rights] there is nothing indefinite. The people of the several States, by adopting these amendments, have defined accurately and recorded permanently their opinion, as to the great principles which they embrace . . .. [V]iewing these amendments as we do, as intended to establish justice -- to secure the blessings of liberty -- to protect person and property from violence; and that these were the very purposes for which government was established, we hold that they constitute a limit to all legislative power, Federal or States, beyond which it cannot go; that these vital truths lie at the foundation of our free, republican institutions; that without this security for personal liberty and private property, our social compact could not exist. No Court should ever presume that it was the design of the people to entrust their representatives with the power to take away or impair these securities. Such an assumption would be against all reason. The very genius, nature and spirit of our institutions amount to a prohibition of such acts of legislation, and will overrule and forbid them."

The picture above is of Hiram Warner, the third member of the Supreme Court of Georgia in 1852, who also concurred in the decision. Here is
a brief biography of Justice Warner, who later became the second Chief Justice of the court, after Justice Lumpkin.

Tuesday, January 16, 2007

Justice Lumpkin's Bill of Rights II

Justice Lumpkin went on to explain why he believed that the Bill of Rights -- or at least the principles set forth in the Bill -- applied to the States:

"It was not because it was supposed that legislation over the subjects here enumerated might be better and more safely entrusted to the State governments, that it was prohibited to Congress. It was to declare to the world the fixed and unalterable determination of our people, that these invaluable rights which had been established at so great a cost of blood and treasure, should never be disturbed by any government . . ..

. . . What confidence will be reposed in a State government, whose legislation should be characterized by acts which disgrace the most tyrannical epoch of the British monarchy? A free people would instantly and indignantly reject it and its authors."

Justice Lumpkin then returned to the theme of "State rights:"

"While this Court yields to none in its devotion to State rights, and be the first to resist all attempts at Federal usurpation, it feels itself called on by the blood of the many martyrs, who nobly died to maintain the great principles of civil liberty contained in these amendments -- our American Magna Charta -- to stand by, support and defend the rights which they guarantee, against all encroachments, whether proceeding from the National or State governments."

Monday, January 15, 2007

Joseph Henry Lumpkin and The Bill of Rights

Joseph Henry Lumpkin was the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Georgia, serving on that court from its establishment in 1845 until his death in 1867. You can find brief biographies of him here and here.

So far as I can tell, the web contains no discussion of Chief Justice Lumpkin's most remarkable opinion, Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353, 1852 WL 1345 (1852). The purpose of this post (and others to follow) is to remedy that omission.

I will return to the facts later, for they contain a supreme irony in this extraordinary opinion. For present, it is sufficient to state that the defendant, James Campbell, was convicted in January 1852 in Superior Court, Richmond, Georgia of the manslaughter of Carl Mays. Saturday night, January 11, 1851, Campbell and Mays were drinking. Late that night, they apparently fell into a dispute. Campbell hit Mays with a stick or branch, and then stabbed him repeatedly with a sharp instrument. Mays died Monday afternoon.

Campbell appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia. On appeal, he asserted that his conviction should be overturned because it was based on out-of-court statements by an absent witness, in violation of the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution, which provided (and still provides) in relevant part that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." The Georgia Constitution of 1798 did not contain a similar provision. One of the questions presented to the court was whether the Confrontation Clause applied to state court proceedings.

Almost twenty years earlier, in
Barron v. Baltimore (1833), the United States Supreme Court had held that the Fifth Amendment and, by implication, the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, did not apply to the states. As we shall see, Chief Justice Lumpkin and the Supreme Court of Georgia did not agree.

Chief Justice Lumpkin delivered the opinion of the court. He enunciated what has been termed a "declaratory" view of the Bill of Rights. That is, he expressed the view that, whether or not the Bill of Rights itself applied to the states, the Bill declared fundamental principles that were binding on any republican government, including the government of the State of Georgia:

"The principles embodied in these amendments. for better securing the lives, liberties, and property of the people, were declared to be the 'birthright' of our ancestors, several centuries previous to the establishment of our government. It is not likely, therefore, that any Court could be found in America of sufficient hardihood to deprive our citizens of these invaluable safeguards."

It is possible that States have the reserved right to ignore these fundamental safeguards? May a State pass a law abridging freedom of speech or of the press? May it establish a state religion? Justice Lumpkin answered these rhetorical questions with words that are both majestic and supremely ironic given their place and time (Georgia 1852):

"Such logic, I must confess, fails to commend itself to my judgment. for let it constantly be borne in mind, that notwithstanding we may have different governments, a nation within a nation, imperium in imperio, we have but one people; and that the same people which, divided into separate communities, constitute the respective State governments, comprise in the aggregate, the United States Government; and that it is in vain to shield them from a blow aimed by the Federal arm, if they are liable to be prostrated by one dealt with equal fatality by their own."

Justice Lumpkin contended that no government "has the right to do wrong." To those who contended otherwise, he cried out:

"From such State rights, good Lord deliver us! I utterly repudiate them from the creed of my political faith!"

In the next post, I will let Chief Justice Lumpkin do most of the talking.

Sunday, December 17, 2006

A Ninth Amendment Primer I

The Ninth Amendment states, quite simply, that “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” Over the past forty years or so, since Justice Arthur Goldberg’s concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965), a debate has developed over the meaning of the Amendment, and in particular over the phrase “other[] [rights] retained by the people.” Does this not suggest – or even plainly state – that the people retain other, unenumerated rights not specifically set forth in the Constitution?

“Progressives” (for want of a better term) have argued that the Ninth Amendment’s reference provides a textual basis for discerning additional rights not specifically described in the Constitution – the right to have an abortion, for example. In his book,
Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty, Randy Barnett has advanced an alternative, libertarian reading of the Constitution based in part on the Ninth Amendment.

There seems little doubt that the ideas of the Founding Generation included a significant strain of natural law thinking. Nonetheless, I am persuaded that the “unenumerated rights” argument ultimately does not fly as a historical matter. The better view is set forth by Kurt T. Lash in two articles published in the Texas Law Journal and available online,
The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 Texas Law Review 331 (Dec. 2004) and The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 Texas Law Review 597 (Feb. 2005).

In brief, Professor Lash argues convincingly that the key word in the Amendment is the word “construed.” One principal argument against the adoption of what became the Bill of Rights was that it was unnecessary. The Constitution created a federal government that was authorized to exercise only those limited powers specifically described in the document. To the extent that the Constitution did not specifically grant powers to the federal government, the people necessarily retained the corresponding rights. It was unnecessary, therefore, to amend the Constitution to protect a right of freedom of speech or of the press (for example), because the Constitution did not grant to the federal government any power over speech or the press. Thus the people already retained those rights.

Even worse, it was argued, was the fact that the passage of a bill of rights might inadvertently create the inference that the federal government had any powers that were not specifically withheld. The Constitution, for example, did not delegate to the federal government the power to tell me what color shirt to wear when I got up in the morning; I had the right to choose whatever color shirt struck my fancy. But would the addition of a bill of rights omitting a right to wear any shirt I choose not suggest that I did not have such a right in the first place, and that the federal government had the power to tell me what color shirt to wear?

The evidence appears overwhelming that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were included in the Bill of Rights to meet these concerns. In this reading, the two amendments complement each other. The Tenth reconfirms the rule that the federal government has only those powers specifically delegated to it. The Ninth is a rule of construction, providing that the enumeration of certain rights in the Bill of Rights should not be construed by negative inference as an enlargement of the powers delegated to the federal government.

What has obscured the connection is that the two amendments use different language. The Tenth refers to “powers”, while the Ninth speaks of “rights:”

Tenth: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”

Ninth: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”

The drafting history, however, confirms that the differing language arises out of the fact that the drafters regarded governmental “powers” and simply the opposite of retained popular “rights.” The reason that the Ninth Amendment refers only to “rights” is merely the result of stylistic polishing. Consider the various versions of the text that became the Ninth Amendment, in chronological order, emphasizing the words “rights” and “powers:”

Virginia Convention June 27, 1788

Seventeenth, That those clauses which declare that Congress shall not exercise certain powers be not interpreted in any manner whatsoever to extend the powers of Congress. But that they may be construed either as making exceptions to the specified powers where this shall be the case, or otherwise as inserted merely for greater caution.

New York Convention July 26, 1788 (the predecessor language of the Tenth Amendment is bracketed)

[[T]hat every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by the said Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, or the departments of the government thereof, remains to the people of the several states, or to their respective state governments, to whom they may have granted the same;] and that those clauses in the said Constitution, which declare, that Congress shall not have or exercise certain powers, do not imply that Congress is entitled to any powers not given by the said Constitution; but such clauses are to be construed either as exceptions to certain specified powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.

Proposed by Madison June 8, 1789

Fourthly, That in article 1st, section 9, between clauses 3 and 4, be inserted these clauses, to wit:

[Numerous other provisions]

That exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitution; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.

House Select Committee July 28, 1789

ART. 1, SEC. 9 – Between PAR. 2 and 3 insert,

[Other provisions, including the predecessors of the First through Fifth and Eighth Amendments]

The enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

House of Representatives August 24, 1789

ARTICLE THE FIFTEENTH

The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Senate September 9, 1789

ARTICLE THE ELEVENTH

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.


Final Proposal to States September 25, 1789

Article the eleventh . . . The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Friday, December 08, 2006

The Fourteenth Amendment and Incorporation VI

All right. Back to the Fourteenth Amendment and Incorporation after a substantial delay. Let's look next at the speech of Senator Luke P. Poland (Republican, VT). Senator Poland's speech is sometimes cited as supporting the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to apply the Bill of Rights to the states. In fact, it proves exactly the opposite.

Senator Poland spoke on June 5, 1886 (thirteen days after Senator Howard gave his speech). He spoke only briefly about Section 1, precisely because, he said, he did not disagree with what had already been said (including, presumably, Senator Howard's explicit and widely-reported statements that the Privileges or Immunites Clause was designed to incorporate the Bill of Rights). Senator Poland explained that "all the questions in the proposed amendments to the Consititution have been so elaborately and ably discussed on former occasions during the present session that I do not feel at liberty to attempt to argue them at length and in detail."

Senator Poland's speech has been misinterpreted because he apparently did not understand that, in Barron v. Baltimore, the Supreme Court had held that the Bill of Rights did not apply to or limit the states -- or at least, in common with many Republicans, Senator Poland seems to have believed that the Constitution, properly construed, had always required the States to protect fundamental rights. He expressed the opinion that the Privileges or Immunities clause secured “nothing beyond what was intended” by the similar provision in the original Constitution -- and he then quoted the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Article IV, Section 2.

But, he complained, slavery had led “to a practical repudiation of the existing provision on this subject, and it was disregarded in many of the states. State legislation was allowed to override it.” It became “really a dead letter.”

In addition, Senator Poland analyzed Section 1 as follows:

“It is essentially declared in the Declaration of Independence and in all the provisions of the Constitution. Notwithstanding this we know that State laws exist, and some of them of very recent enactment, in direct violation of these principles. Congress has already shown its desire and intention to uproot and destroy all such partial State legislation in the passage of what is called the civil rights bill.... It certainly seems desirable that no doubt should be left existing as to the power of Congress to enforce principles lying at the foundation of all republican government if they be denied or violated by the States.”

The reference to “State laws . . . of very recent enactment” almost certainly alludes to laws passed by southern states restricting the right to bear arms, and the reference “to all the provisions of the Constitution” almost certainly includes the Bill of Rights, and the Second Amendment in particular. Congress had recently received a report complaining about the passage of laws in southern States depriving returning freedmen, recently discharged from the Union Army, of the right to carry arms (the penalties included flogging). In response, just days before Senator Poland’s speech, the House had passed the second Freedmen’s Bill, which contained a provision protecting “the constitutional right to bear arms.” (Ironically, the jurisdictional basis for the provision was the Thirteenth Amendment – reflecting the fact that many Republicans believed that that amendment had already imposed the Bill of Rights on the States.)

In short, Senator Poland may have had a mistaken understanding of the original meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Article IV. However, any reasonable person listening to Senator Poland’s comments in 1866 would have had every reason to believe that his views concerning Section 1 were entirely in accord with those previously expressed by Senator Howard and that Senator Poland believed that Section 1 would forbid States from depriving their citizens of their basic rights, including those embodied in the Bill of Rights.

Previous posts:

The Fourteenth Amendment and Incorporation I

The Fourteenth Amendment and Incorporation II

The Fourteenth Amendment and Incorporation III

The Fourteenth Amendment and Incorporation IV

The Fourteenth Amendment and Incorporation V
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