Wednesday, May 27, 2009

The Missouri Compromise: Henry Geyer Spots a Flaw


While rummaging for information about the Missouri Compromise, I stumbled across a 1916 book by one Floyd Calvin Shoemaker entitled Missouri’s Struggle for Statehood 1804-1821. In it, the author makes a claim that I’ve seen nowhere else. I don’t vouch for it, but it’s a fascinating piece of trivia if true.

You may recall that the version of Section 26 of Article III of the Missouri Constitution delivered to Washington in 1820 contained some odd punctuation and paragraph breaks, as follows:
The general assembly shall have no power to pass laws; First, For the emancipation of slaves without the consent of their owners, or without paying them, before such emancipation, a full equivalent for such slaves so emancipated; and, Second, To prevent bona fide emigrants to this state, or actual settlers therein, from bringing from any of the United States, or from any of their territories, such persons as may there be deemed to be slaves, so long as any persons of the same description are allowed to be held as slaves by the laws of this state.

They shall have power to pass laws; First, To prohibit the introduction into this state of any slave who may have committed any high crime in any other state or territory; Second, To prohibit the introduction of any slave for the purpose of speculation, or as an article of trade or merchandise; Third, To prohibit the introduction of any slave, or the offspring of any slave, who heretofore may have been or who hereafter may be, imported from any foreign country into the United States, or any territory thereof, in contravention of any existing statute of the United States; and, Fourth, To permit the owners of slaves to emancipate them, saving the rights of creditors, where the person so emancipating will give security that the slave so emancipated shall not become a public charge.

It shall be their duty, as soon as may be, to pass such laws as may be necessary.

First, To prevent free negroes and mulattoes from coming to, and settling in, this state, under any pretext whatsoever; and,

Second, To oblige the owners of slaves to treat them with humanity, and to abstain from all injuries to them extending to life or limb.


Henry Clay’s compromise resolution resolving the second Missouri crisis, in turn, referred to the provision exhorting the Missouri legislature to bar “free negroes and mulattoes” from the state as “the fourth clause of the twenty-sixth section of the third article of the [Missouri] constitution.”

Presumably, the reference to the “fourth clause” of Section 26 was intended to point to the fourth paragraph of the oddly-paragraphed Section (“First, To prevent free negroes and mulattoes from coming to, and settling in, this state, under any pretext whatsoever . . .”). But the fact is that that sentence was not the fourth “clause” of Section 26.

Shoemaker asserts that, during the course of the debates in the Missouri legislature concerning whether and how to respond to Clay’s proviso, Henry S. Geyer, then Speaker of the Missouri House, pointed out this discrepancy and argued that Missouri legislators could agree that the “fourth clause” did not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause because the “fourth clause” in fact had nothing to do with barring “free negroes and mulattoes”:
In the course of the debate, Geyer "stated a fact not generally known – That the clause mentioned in the Resolution of Congress is not the one concerning free negroes and mulattoes. There are but three principle clauses in the twenty-sixth section of the third article, and the only clause distinguished as a fourth – is the last subordinate branch of the second principal clause and provides that the General Assembly shall have power, to permit the owners of slaves to emancipate them saving the rights of Creditors, where the persons so emancipating will give security that the slave so emancipated will not become a public charge. – But counting the clauses of the twenty-sixth section without reference to the numbers thereto attached and the fourth clause, will be that which gives the General Assembly power “To prohibit the introduction of any slave for the purpose of speculation, or as an article of trade or merchandise."

Shoemaker does not exactly assert that Geyer’s argument made the difference between passage or defeat of Missouri’s resolution purporting to comply with Clay’s resolution. But he does suggest that the argument at least made the majority in support far larger than it might otherwise have been:
[After Geyer’s argument, t]he bill and preamble were then agreed to by a large majority and reported from the committee of the whole without amendment. In this form it passed the House and was sent to the Senate.

* * *

When the resolution of Congress was considered by the general assembly of Missouri, there was opposition to passing the solemn public act. It is impossible to say accurately how strong was this opposition. Some objected to the wording of the solemn public act, others to the entire condition imposed by Congress. At this juncture Henry S. Geyer, Speaker of the House, later United States Senator from Missouri, in a speech advocating the passage of the solemn public act, pointed out that the clause in the Missouri constitution designated by Congress was not the free negro and mulatto clause to which that body objected. . . . Following this revelation by Geyer, the solemn public act passed by a large majority.

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